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The proposed Uruguay Round reductions in MFN
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of the Uruguay Round. What offsetting actions are Similar favorable terms of preferential access also exist possible and appropriate? Aggressive reform of the in Japan and the united States, although the preference African countries' own trade regimes appears to be the margins are smalle. than in the EEC.
most effective way to counter the effects of the erosion Using a trade projection model developed by the of OECD preferences.
Introduction
A problem which has complicated multilateral trade negotiations like GATT's Uruguay Round is that OECD countries have adopted important departures from the most- ' Braga and Yeats (1992 , Table 1 ) estimate that almost 50 percent of world trade in manufactures occurs under preferences. European trade accounts for almost two thirds of this total with the EEC and EFTA arrangements being of particular importance. Aside from the intra-trade of countries within these two groups, which is all duty free, a protocol allows for duty free trade in manufactures between EEC and EFTA. According to Braga-Yeats tabulations the European arrangements cover a trade value more than seven times greater than that of NAFTA intra-trade. See Appendix A in Schott (1989) for a listing of free trade arrangements that have been notified to the GATT. 2 Several points should be noted concerning GSP preferences. First, some agricultural and manufactured products are exempted and developing countries' exports of these goods encounter MFN tariffs. Second, GSP treatment may be withdrawn from specific products once predetermined ceilings are reached. Third, several countries like Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan (China) have been "graduated" from GSP schemes and no longer receive their tariff preferences. Other developing country suppliers may also have GSP preferences withdrawn if they fail "competitive need" tests, i.e., they are judged able to compete successfully with other suppliers without preferences. Many GSP schemes extend even lower preferential tariffs than those receivsd by other developing countries to the "least developed" countries. Least developed countries in Africa are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia.
Since the Uruguay Round will lower trade barriers on an MFN basis it poses a dilemma for preferc ¶lce-receiving countries. Specifically, MFN tariff reductions will erode these countries' margins of preference and cause their competitive position to deteriorate vis-avis other suppliers. Trade losses will occur as some preference-receiving goods are displaced (diverted) by exports from other (non-preference receiving) countries. As a result, preferencereceiving countries could justifiably try to minimize reductions in MFN tariffs. 3 Overall, the strategy which these countries might adopt vis-a-vis the multilateral trade negotiations could be determined by an assessment of whether the likely trade gains from lower MFN tariffs on their non-preference receiving goods would offset the expected losses from their preference-receiving exports.
This study examines the problem of preference erosion from the perspective of Sub-Saharan African countries. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was selected for analysis due to the extensive multiple tariff preferences these countries receive in OECD markets (i.e JSP, Lome Convention and, in many cases, least developed country preferences), and the fact that the region's export growth has been below that of most other countries (World Bank, 1992) .
Three separate issues are addressed. First, the relative importance of specific products and of OECD markets for African exporters is assessed to deternin: where analysis of the Uruguay Round's effects should focus. Second, detailed information on trade barriers maintained by the World Bank and UNCTAD is employed to assess the importance of tariffs (and tariff nreferences) facing African countries in their key cxport markets. This section employs a World Bank trade projection model to quantify the effects of MFN tariff cuts on African exports. Third, the study employs an inventory ef OECD countries' nontariff measures to assess the incidence of these restrictions on African exports and the likely effects of their liberalization.
The intention here is to determine whether or not liberalization of nontariff barriers could offset potential export losses African countries will experience due to erosion of tariff prefereiuces.
The Relative Importance of African Export Markets
An important first question for any assessment of MFN tariff cuts relates to identification of the key markets for African exports since it is here that trade barrier liberalization will have its maximum impact. Table 1 provides relevant information by showing the value and share of individual African country exports destined for major groups of importing countries, i.e., -" developed countries, the EEC, North America, other Sub-Saharan countries, etc. 4 The major point that emerges from these figures relates to the overall importance of Having established the importance of OECD markets (particularly the EEC) for Africa, a second related consideration for assessing the influence of MFN tariff cuts concerns identification of the major African export products. One major poist that emerges from Table 2 concerns the importance of raw materials and non-temperate zone foodstuffs in African exports and the unimportance of manufictured goods. This product orientation has impcrtant implications since most studies (see Laird and Yeats, 1987, for example) show that OECD tariffs and other tradel barriers are relatively high for manufactures but are generally zero or relatively low for raw material products of thle sort Africa exports.
Non-fur clothing (SITC 841) normally faces highly .estrictive barriers in O ICD markets and corntitutes a large share of many developing countries'
exports, but these products only account for abou;. 4 percent of total African non-oil exports which mostly originate in Mauritius (this country accounts for about 90 percent of all African clothing expoits to the OECD). 6 Sugar and honey (SITC 061) exports face restrictive trade barriers in OECD markets (including strict quotas and variable import levies), as do exports of ferrous metals and fish: but for the most part the products in Table 2 generally encounter lower 'The statistics on "manufactures" exports in Table 2 may misrepresent the importance of these items in African exports due to anomalies in two product groups. Pearls and precious stones (SITC 667) account for about 10 percent of African non-oil exports, but there is disagreement as to whether these items are "manutactures" (as they are recorded in Table 2 ). The problem is that the SITC does not diffe:entiate between cut and polished gems (which could be considered a manufactured good) and raw unprocessed stones which are a qvestionable manufacture. Mainly the latter are mainly exported from Africa, while polished gems typically are exported from more industrialized countries (like Israel). Second, ships and boats (SITC 735) account for about 6 percent of African exports, but these transactions largely reflect transfers under "flags of convenience" and not true manufacturing activity. Convention normally defines manufactured goods as all items classified in SITC groups 6 through 8 less 6£, although it is recognized that there are problems with this procedure (See Yeats 1992). 
Tariff Protection Against African Exports
The previous analysis showed Sub-Saharan exporters are primarily iependant on developed countries for export mnkets and, within this group, the EEC is of special significance. Analysis of the terms of access that African countries have in the EEC is of key importance in any assessment of the impact of he Uruguay Round or general MFN tariff cuts. The key points evident from Table 3 relate to the high concentration of most African countries' exports in a very small number of tariff lines and the importance of existing trade preferences for these items. As an iMlustration, Table 3 shows Angola exported 134 ta.-iff line products to the EEC (see the right most column --the EEC customs vchedule distinguishes 'For many of the raw material products in Table 2 , trade barri(.rv increase or "escalate" with further processing. As an example, rew cotton (SITC 263) is generally freely traded, but more restrictive barriers are encountered after the item is processed into yarn, textiles, or clothing xsee Yeats 1987 for an analysis of the effects of suc ade barrier escalation on the exports of developing countries). Uruguay Round MFN tariff cuts may reduce important preference margins for some fledgling African processing industries that have not yet achieved sufficient size to be included in Table 2 . Reductions in tariff preferences for these items may remove an important incentive to the further development of African processing industries. 9 betw..en 9,506 individual tariff lines) and that 25 of these items faced a zero MFN tariff.
However, on 106 line items Angola received a zero preferenc-rate (second column from the left) with the result that 131 or 98 percent of Angola's exports enter the EEC free of duty. 8 In only two tariff lines (involving $10,000 in total exports of fiesh grapes and strawberries) did
Angola not receive preferences and, as a result, paid the full MFN tariff. In short, Angola could experience trade gains from MFN tariff cuts on these two product. and experience export losses on 131 tariff line items.
The data for other African exporters reveal a situation similar to diat for Angola.
Preferences result in at least 97 percent of each African country's exports entering the Community free of duty, and in two cases (Congo and Guinea) no duties are paid on any line item. Table 3 also shows how markedly the profile of protection against African countries' exports differs from that of ReDublic of Korea and Taiwan (China). Omy four percent of the latter's eyoorts (less than 200 tariff line items out of a total of over 4,000) have EEC duty free access --not due to preferences but because of a zero MFN rate. These comparisons underscore the differences in strategies regarding tariffs in the Uruguay Round. The Asian NICs would clearly have a major interest in broad-based MFN tariff cuts, while African countries would want to limit MFN duty reductions to preserve their preferences. 8 The picture is complicated somewhat by quotas or ceilings on some products receiving preferences. After these predetermined ceilings are exceeded further imports are taxed at the prevailing MFN rate. Comprehensive tariff line level information on how often these ceilings have been hit is not available, but aggregate statistics of preference utilization ratios provided by the EEC suggest that African countries' exports generally do not exceed ceilings. for Taiwan (China) and the Republic of Korea have again been included to contrast the African situation with that of more "industrialized" countries.
In the EEC, the average tariff facing African exporters typically ranges from zero to three-tenths of a percent with Uganda recording a high of 0.6 percent --due mostly to a tariff of 18 percent on its exports of fresh grapes. The preference margins these tariffs provide African countries are typically in the two to four percentage point range and reach a high of 4.9 points for Swaziland.' 0 Although the margins vary, every one of the 30 African countries 9 The duties shown in Table 4 are the unwe:ghted averages of tariffs applied to the African country's exports and the unweighted average paid by competitors. The tariff facing "other" exporters is the unweighted average of the MFN, GSP, Least Developed, ACP, or regional preference tariff applied to imports from all other suppliers of the same goods. Some industrial and advanced developing countries may face duties that are considerably higher than suggested by these African preference margins if there are significant imports from other Sub-Saharan countries, or if other preferences (GSP, EFTA-EEC, Least Developed, regional arrangements, etc.) cover a high share of trade and these rates are considerably below MFN duties.
'"Swaziland exports mandarin and other oranges to the EEC and pays a full MFN duty of 4 percent on these shipments --as it does on exports of a several fresh agricultural products including asparagus, lemons and other citrus. Outside the agricultural sector, Swaziland faces a MFN tariff of 8.5 percent on coal exports to the Community of about $1.6 million. 'Negative values show the average preferential tariff margins (in points) that the African exporter has over all other exporters of the same goods. Positive values indicate that the exporter faces a higher than average tariff due to preferences other countries receive. All tariffs shown above are the simple average (unweighted) of duties paid on the country's exports. listed in Table 4 faces tariffs that are, on average, below those paid by other exporters. For some individual products these preferential tariff margins are 20 percentage points or more.
This situation is markedly different from that of the Asian NICs. Taiwan (China) pays an average tariff of 7.5 percent on the goods it exports --a rate that is 4.0 percentage points higher than that facing all other exporters of the same items. EEC tariffs facing Korea average 7.8 percent --4.2 points higher than that facing other exporters (many of which receive preferences) of the same goods. Again these comparisons accent the major differences these countries have toward tariff negotiations --preference receivers would want their privileged status preserved while other countries would want to secure maximum possible reductions in MF i f fs. Table 4 shows that African countries also receive important prefere . due to the GSP) in the United States and Japan, but the situation differs somewhat from thLa .X: 'he EEC. First, the average U.S. and Japanese tariff is often higher than in Europe (i.e., an average 9.8 percent duty is paid on Togo's exports to Japan; the tariffs on Mauritius' exports to the United States average 6.4 percent) and the margins of preference are often lower." In several cases, the US-Canadian and US-Israel FTAs, or US Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) result in zero tariffs being applied to competitors' products with the result that African exporters pay a higher-than-average tariff.' 2 For this reason further analysis is needed to determine "The high Japanese average is largely due to a tariff of 25 percent on Togo's exports of prepared Pnd preserved tomatoes. The results for Mauritius are due to US tariffs of up to 35 percent on a number of textile and clothing products including men and boys shirts, babies blouses, and sweaters.
' 2 Adverse African tariff differentials are largest for Gabon and Nigeria because US customs regulations preclude the extension of GSP tariffs to OPEC members. As a result, textile and clothing exports from these countries face a U.S. MFN duty of over 20 percent while U.S. FTA or GSP tariffs are in the range of zero to four percent. Ethiopia also had GSP treatment withdrawn due to US opposition to the government's policies.
whether African countries would experience net trade gains or losses in the US and Japan.
The Trade Effects of MFN Tariff Cuts
The previous analysis showed a EEC MFN tariff liberalization would have adverse consequences for all African countries' exports due to preference erosion, and many could also experience net trade losses in the United States and Japan. This raises the key question of how large would the overall OECD displacement be, and which African countries would be most seriously affected? For answers, a trade projection model developed by the World Bank was used to simulate the effects of MFN tariff cuts (and preference erosion) on African exports. A full description of the model (named SMART --Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) can be found in World Bank (1992) or Erzan and Yeats (1992) .'3 Baldwin and Murray (1977) . Other frequently referenced studies include Ahmad (1978) , Clague (1971) , Pomfret (1986) and Sapir and Baldwin (1983) . The SMART model incorporates many features of the models used in these analyses. One important point to note is that none of these models account for the effects of linkages between the export sector and other supporting sectors of the economy. As such, they understate the importance of export changes on overall changes in the level of economic activity. An offsetting factor, which also is not accounted for, is that a libera;ization of OECD trade barriers should accelerate economic growth in these countries. This, in turn, would increase the demand for African exports.
' 4 Although the precise magnitude of the Uruguay Round tariff cuts are not yet known, it is expected that they might lower existing MFN tariffs by as much as 50 percent. In this case, the African countries' EEC trade losses would be about one-half the figures reported in Table 5 . A roughly proportional relationship exists between the depth of the eventual Uruguay Round tariff cuts and the projections for the EEC shown in the table. Thqt is, if the Round were to liberalize tariffs by (say) 30 percent the African trade losses would be about one-third those reported. This relation does not hold for the United States and Japan where a 50 percent MFN tariff reduction might produce larger African losses than those shown in the table --see footnote 16 for an explanation of why this occurs. annual African trade losses of over one-quarter billion dollars (note t"at Table 6 This situation differs markedly fror that of Taiwan (China) and the Republic of Korea where trade gains of 20 percent or more are projected in the EEC and US markets. Lower export gains are estimated in Japan --due mainly to the erosion of some GSP preferences Japan gives these two countries --but the MFN tariff liberalization still increases Taiwan (China) and Korea's exports by 5 to 6 percent.
An important point to note concerning the annual projections in Table 5 is that these trade changes will occur, ceterus paribus, in each and every year after the MFN tariff cut takes place. Table 6 provides a different perspective on these projections by showing each country's annual net gains or losses in the three OECD markets combined, as well as the present ' 6 A crucial factor influencing trade gains and loses in the United States is the depth of the MFN tariff cut, since some preferential duties are set at relatively high levels (see, for example, the statistics for Botswana and Cote d'Ivoire in Table 5 ). As US MFN rates are reduced down to the level of the nonzero preferential tariff, African countries will experience trade diversion. However, further reductions in MFN rates will produce trade creation (gains) that will start to offset the previous losses. This explains why, for example, a U.S. trade gain is projected for Botswana in Table 5 even though the average preferential margin on this country's exports is 1 .1 percentage points. If US MFN duties were cut in half (and not completely liberalized) many of the African countries showing trade gains in Table  5 would record trade losses. 
Nontariff Measures Facing African Exports
Although the previous analysis demonstrated that African exporters would experience trade losses if tariff preferences were eliminated, the possibility exists that they may still experience net gains from a general trade liberalization. Apart from tariffs, African exports may encounter nontariff measures and, in some sectors --particularly textiles, clothing and temperate zone agriculture --these restrictions have an important retardating effect on some developing countries' exports (see Laird and Yeats, 1991) . Could the potential African trade gains from an NTM liberalization be sufficient to offset the projected losses associated with "These present value calculations are based on a discount rate of 5 percent which approximates the current spread between internationally-competitive interest rates and rates of inflation in OECD countries. This figure was chosen under the assumption that the future value of increased African exports will rise in line with general rates of inflation. MFN tariff cuts? Table 7 provides relevant information by tabulating the value of African non-fuel exports to all OECD countries and the share (percentage) of this trade subject to a nontariff measure. Similar data for the EEC, Japan and United States is also shown separately. 18 As indicated, about 18 percent of the $16.8 billion of African exports encounter nontariff measures, but there is considerable variation in this share across OECD markets and over African countries.
For example, only about 10 percent of African exports to the United States encounter NTMs (implying about $163 million in affected trade) while the corresponding trade coverage ratios for Japan and the EEC are between 22 to 23 percent.
An examination of the statistics in Table 7 shows that a relatively few countries may encounter important non-tariff measures. Almost 65 percent of Mauritius' exports encounter NTMs --largely variable import levies on sugar and Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) quotas on textile and clothing. Mauritius is exceptional in that it (and to a much lessor extent Nigeria) is the only Sub-Saharan country whose exports are restricted by the MFA (see Table   ' These tabulations utilize an inventory of nontariff trade measures maintained by the UNCTAD Secretariat in Geneva. For a description of the inventory and how it is compiled see Laird and Yeats (1991, chapter 4) . One weakness of NTB coverage ratios reported in Table 7 is that they are computed using "own" trade weights. As such, products facing restrictive NTMs enter the calculation of the overall coverage ratio with relatively low (or zero) weights. Also, the inventory data (and Table 7 ) tell nothing about the restrictiveness or ad valorem equivalents of different NTBs (i.e., quotas, variable import levies, licensing requirements, "voluntary" export restraints, etc.), but merely indicate whethe; a measure is present or not. In spite of these limitations, however, NTM inventories have been widely used in research and analysis of trade barriers. See Laird and Yeats (1989) , Walter (1969 )(1972 ), or World Bank (1993 for illustrative applications. See Varangis et. al. (1993) for a discussion of the rationale for, and effects of, these measures. These requirements, which almost certainly do not have a major restrictive Le .ct on trade, largely account for the Congo's relatively high NTB coverage ratio. Mauritania's exports of fish to Japan are subject to quotas and this accounts for the OECD coverage ratio of 48 percent.
'Several points should be noted with regard to these tabulations. First, the UNCTAD inventory does not record a single instance where an African country was subject to a "voluntary" export restraint. These VERS are often among the most restrictive types of nontariff measures applied to exports (Laird and Yeats, 1991) . Second, the sum of the trade coverage ratios for individual types of NTMs may exceed the combined coverage ratio for all measures. This is due to "stacking" or the multiple application of more than one nontariff measure on a single product. For example, US raw sugar imports are subject both to quotas and variable import levies. trade coverage by quantitative restrictions --measures which general do have important trade constraining effects --only exceeding 10 percent for three African countries, namely, C6te d'Ivoire, Mauritius and Senegal. All in all, the impression that emerges from Table 8 is that anv general removal of these measures would probably be insufficient to offset African trade losses due to erosion of OECD tariff preferences."
Summary and Conclusions
How much are OECD trade preferences worth to Sub-Saharan Africa? The empirical evidence developed in this study suggests $4 billion in present value terms is an appropriate estimate, and that African export losses associated with an erosion of these preferences within a Uruguay Round agreement would likely exceed any gains from liberalization of nontariff measures. These observations suggest that African countries will probably experience net trade losses as a result of Uruguay Round tariff cuts, although the magnitude of these losses cannot be projected until the depth and structure of MFN tariff cuts are finalized. African export performance has consistently been below that of other countries (see World Bank, 1992) and this performance should worsen further relative to countries like Taiwan (China) and the Republic of Korea that will experience important positive trade gains as a result of the Uruguay Round.
In order for African countries not to experience net economic losses, otfsetting policies 21 This conclusion is based on a detailed survey of nontariff measures' estimated ad valorem equivalents published in Laird and Yeats (1991) . In most cases, licensing requirements were found to have very low nominal equivalents --probably just one to two percent for costs of compliance --while Varangas et. al. (1993) indicate that eco-labeling requirements add less than IG percent to the price of exports. Erzan and Svedberg (1991) come to much the same conclusion, i.e., that NTMs have only a relatively minor effect on African exports, in an independent analysis of the types of trade barriers facing African exporters. will have to be adopted. It is unlikely that any measures relating to OECD tariffs could be effectively utilized since African countries now often face zero duties in these markets (see Table   3 ). This precludes any attempts to restore pre-Uruguay Round preferential tariff margins.
OECD countries couid, however, target those nontariff measures that are restricting African trade --like the quotas and variable import levies or sugar --for full and early removal.
OECD countries could also increase assistance to Africa where such help is required for efficiency-increasing structural adjustment reforms.
Probably one of the most promising areas for compensatory reforms centers in the African countries' own trade regimes. Detailed statistics compiled by UNCTAD (1987) on developing countries trade barriers show that African tariffs are generally far higher than average, and that their trade regimes are often NTM-ridden. Extensive studies by the World Bank (see Thomas and Nash, 1991) document the important economic gains that can result from trade policy reform and it appears that such reform could have a major positive impact in Africa.
In short, the best response to an erosion of trade preferences in foreign markets would appear to be an aggressive liberalization of African countries own trade barriers.
